In October 2025, executives at Deutsche Börse Group may have wondered whether they had heard correctly. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz publicly endorsed the idea of a European stock exchange. “We need some sort of European Stock Exchange so that successful companies such as BioNTech from Germany don’t have to list on the New York Stock Exchange,” he said.  

Seriously?  

Since the turn of the millennium, Deutsche Börse Group has made 7 (yes: seven!) attempts to join forces with other market operators in Europe. It was rebuffed seven times. Political backing was – to put it mildly – limited at best. The first attempt failed in May 2000, when plans to merge with the London Stock Exchange into an “International Exchange” collapsed. In London, concerns centered on integration costs; in Frankfurt, opposition focused on plans to relocate blue-chip trading and the corporate headquarters to London. The idea that Frankfurt would instead host the growth-stock segment later became a liability for every subsequent merger attempt. After the debacle of the Neuer Markt, critics of iX felt doubly vindicated.  

“Locusts” and bad timing  

Four years later, hedge fund TCI orchestrated a shareholder revolt against the second attempt at a Frankfurt-London tie-up. As half the country debated “locusts” – the pejorative term for activist investors – the plans were shelved once again. 

On the third attempt, the European Commission intervened. It objected to a de facto monopoly in European bond and repo clearing. However, the unfortuitous timing was likely a decisive factor in the dwindling support, given that In June 2016, 51.89% of British voters opted for Brexit. From that point on, it was clear that any merged exchange would be headquartered outside the EU – fuel for critics on the continent.  

Four years earlier, the European Commission had already derailed merger plans between Deutsche Börse Group and NYSE Euronext. Debate over the “relevant markets” went on for months. What sounds like a technical detail ultimately proved decisive. Judgements about market dominance hinge to a large extent on where the lines are drawn – in particular on whether over-the-counter business is taken into account. The 2011–12 approach to Euronext, meanwhile, marked a second try, after an earlier bid for consolidation had failed in 2006.  

For the sake of completeness, we should also recall the unsuccessful efforts to forge closer ties with Switzerland’s SIX and Borsa Italiana.  

So is the consolidation of Europe’s exchanges simply a chronicle of failure? Not at all. Over the past two decades, Deutsche Börse Group has acquired a wide range of companies whose business is closely intertwined with securities trading, clearing, and settlement: 360T, STOXX, Axioma, ISS, SimCorp – the list goes on. Which prompts the question: Does it really create value to pursue mega-mergers between exchanges, each time triggering national anxieties and facing antitrust risk? Or is it more sensible for a market operator to strengthen specific parts of the value chain where new demand is emerging?  

The market’s verdict  

At least the Deutsche Börse Group’s shareholders appear to have reached a conclusion. The company’s market capitalization has increased eightfold between 2004 and today – despite the failed merger attempts. Or perhaps precisely because of them.  

Of course, larger liquidity pools enable tighter spreads, and scaling helps with returns and efficiency. The question, however, is whether these benefits outweigh the substantial economic and political costs of exchange mergers. That calculus must be made separately in each case.  

Which leaves the broader issue: Does Europe need a single stock exchange? Notably, investors tend to rank other priorities higher – such as harmonizing national insolvency and tax regimes, or reforming retirement provision along the lines of Sweden’s capital-market-based model.  

Fragmentation in trading and post-trade infrastructure, spread across numerous platforms, custodians and counterparties, remains a source of friction. Yet centralization is not necessarily seen as the preferred remedy. Instead, attention is shifting toward greater coherence – most recently reflected in the European Commission’s market-infrastructure package aimed at advancing a savings and investment union.  

Perhaps these were the considerations Friedrich Merz had in mind when he called for a European stock exchange.   

Dr. Detlef Fechtner is Chief Reporter at Börsen-Zeitung.